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HABEAS CORPUS
OVERVIEW
Due to the large number of habeas corpus petitions which eventu-
ally find their way to the Tenth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit Survey, for the
first time, devotes a separate article to coverage of the more significant
habeas corpus cases. In past issues, habeas questions have been ad-
dressed in the criminal law and procedure articles.
During the past survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided several
noteworthy habeas cases involving the contemporaneous objection
rule-a state rule of procedure requiring timely objection at trial in or-
der for the objectionable issue to be heard on appeal. The article also
considers a few cases in which the Tenth Circuit qualified the exhaustion
of state remedies principle. Finally, this survey covers an appeal of a
denial of a habeas petition based on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, one of the few cases in which a habeas petitioner encountered
success at the Tenth Circuit.
I. THE CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently heard three significant
cases involving the contemporaneous objection rule. Two of the cases,
Runnels v. Hess,' and Hux v. Murphy,2 limited the principles set forth by
the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Sykes. 3 The third, Al-
mond v. Angelone,4 refused to apply the Sykes cause and prejudice test and
reviewed the case, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner presented
claims in his petition for federal habeas corpus relief that he failed to
present in his initial state post-conviction petition.
A. Background
One of the leading Supreme Court cases addressing a habeas peti-
tioner's failure to comply with the contemporaneous objection rule is
Wainwright v. Sykes. 5 In Sykes, respondent Sykes sought federal habeas
corpus review, claiming that his state court conviction had resulted from
inculpatory statements made by him and wrongly admitted into evi-
dence. Sykes did not object to the evidence when it was presented at
trial, nor later on appeal. He objected to the evidence unsuccessfully in
a motion to vacate his conviction and in two state habeas corpus peti-
1. 713 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1983).
2. 733 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1984).
3. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
4. No. 83-1550 (10th Cir. Oct. 18, 1983).
5. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Sykes involved the Flordia contemporaneous objection rule.
Under the Florida rule, a criminal defendant must move to suppress inculpatory state-
ments before trial. The trial judge may, at his discretion, hear a motion or an appropriate
objection at trial. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(i).
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tions. 6 The United States Supreme Court, relying heavily on its earlier
decisions in Davis v. United States7 and Francis v. Henderson,8 held that
Sykes was barred from federal habeas corpus review because he failed to
contemporaneously object to the admission of his inculpatory state-
ments and did not show both cause for the noncompliance and actual
prejudice from the noncompliance. 9 The Sykes Court concluded its deci-
sion by underscoring the advantage of adopting the cause and prejudice
test of Francis over the more lenient deliberate bypass test of Fay v.
Noia. 10
The Fay v. Noia deliberate bypass test, announced by the Court in
1976, per Justice Brennan, allows a federal judge to deny habeas corpus
review only if the petitioner "deliberately by-passed the orderly proce-
dure of the state courts."' I The Sykes cause and prejudice standard,
however, severely restricted Fay's broad grant of review, leaving peti-
tioners only with the dubious assurance that the cause and prejudice test
adequately guarantees that a federal habeas corpus court will not be
barred "from adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional
claim of a defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be
the victim of a miscarriage of justice."'
12
The cause and prejudice test has several advantages over the delib-
erate bypass test. It allows the court to avoid the difficult task of prying
into the state of mind of the petitioner, or his counsel, for purposes of
determining whether the "bypass" was deliberate. The test also equita-
bly affords petitioners an opportunity to explain their failure to object
and goes to the core of the issue: whether the petitioner has suffered
actual harm or prejudice as a result of the error. Furthermore, the cause
and prejudice standard places greater emphasis on the state court pro-
ceeding than does Fay v. Noia. Justice Rehnquist reasoned in Sykes:
The accused is in the courtroom, the jury is in the box, the
judge is on the bench, and the witnesses, having been subpoe-
naed and duly sworn, await their turn to testify. Society's re-
sources have been concentrated at that time and place in order
to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question of
6. Sykes alleged that he did not understand his Miranda rights due to his intoxicated
condition at the time of his arrest. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 74-75.
7. 411 U.S. 233 (1973). The Davis Court held that under rule 12(b) the petitioner
waived his objection, reasoning: "no reason has been suggested why petitioner or his
attorney could not have ascertained all of the facts necessary to present the objection to
the court prior to the trial . . . . Petitioner has shown no cause why the court should
grant him relief from his waiver of the objection . Id. at 244-45 (quoting the district
court opinion).
8. 425 U.S. 536 (1976). In Francis, the Court upheld a felony murder conviction
where the petitioner was seeking collateral relief from the state court, claiming that blacks
had been excluded from the grand jury that indicted him. The Court held that the rule
that the petitioner must show not only cause for his failure to challenge but also actual
prejudice, applied with equal force when a federal court is asked in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding to overturn a state court conviction.
9. 433 U.S. at 86-87.
10. 372 U.S. at 391.
11. Id. at 438.
12. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91.
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guilt or innocence of one of its citizens.'
3
Hence, finality, comity and economy are all clear results of the cause and
prejudice test. It is unknown, however, whether this stricter standard in
fact provides relief to petitioners who have suffered an actual miscar-
riage of justice.
B. Runnels v. Hess
The Tenth Circuit first received Runnels v. Hess 14 in 1981 on an ap-
peal from the district court's grant of Runnels's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Runnels had petitioned for federal habeas relief in the
district court, after exhausting his state remedies. Runnels attacked his
conviction on the ground that during trial the prosecutor violated his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination by improperly empha-
sizing Runnels's failure to testify. 15 The district court agreed and
granted the writ.
The Tenth Circuit vacated and remanded the original district court
decision with instructions that the lower court proceed consistent with
the cause prong of the Sykes decision. 16 The district court complied,
denying the writ. However, while the appeal of this district court opin-
ion was pending, the Supreme Court decided Engle v. Isaac17 and United
States v. Frady,' 8 leading the Tenth Circuit again to remand the case for
findings regarding the effect of Frady and Isaac on the cause and actual
prejudice prongs of Sykes.' 9
Not surprisingly, in its "Findings on Partial Remand," the district
court stated that under Isaac and Frady, Runnels failed to make a suffi-
cient showing of cause and actual prejudice required for habeas corpus
13. Id. at 90. For a discussion of the contributions the contemporaneous objection
rule makes to criminal litigation, see id. at 88-91.
14. 653 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1981) (An Oklahoma state circuit convicted Runnels of
rape and sentenced him to 63 years imprisonment); See also Runnels, 713 F.2d 596 (10th
Cir. 1983) (Order on Remand).
15. See Runnels v. State, 562 P.2d 932, 937 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
893 (1977).
16. 653 F.2d at 1364. "We, however, are unable to find any facts in the record bear-
ing on defense counsel's reasons or cause for noncompliance with the Oklahoma contem-
poraneous objection rule. . . . Proof of cause for noncompliance is essential; mere
speculation that it existed is not enough." Id.
17. 456 U.S. 107 (1982). Isaac presented the question whether a convicted respon-
dent, who failed to comply with OHIo R. CRIM. P. 30 requiring contemporaneous objec-
tions to jury instructions. may challenge the constitutionality of those instructions in
federal habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Applying the cause and preju-
dice standard in Sykes, the Court held that respondent was barred from asserting his consti-
tutional claim in the federal habeas corpus proceeding due to his failure to comply with
Ohio's contemporaneous objection rule at the trial. Id. at 108.
18. 456 U.S. 152 (1982). Frady, originally sentenced to death by electrocution by a
jury in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia for first-degree murder and
robbery, was resentenced to a life term by the court of appeals. The issue before the
United States Supreme Court, however, was whether Frady's failure to object to a jury
instruction at trial may prevent him from challenging the instruction fifteen years later
under FED. R. CRIM. P. 30. Applying the cause and prejudice test of Sykes, the Court con-
cluded that Frady fell short of meeting his burden of showing actual prejudice and thus
habeas corpus relief could not be granted. Id. at 153.
19. 713 F.2d at 597.
1984]
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relief. The district court concluded that it erred in granting Runnels's
writ of habeas corpus. 20 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district
court's finding and quashed the writ.
2 '
The essence of the cause requirement of Sykes was clearly articu-
lated in the district court's "Additional Findings on Partial Remand."
'22
The district court found that under the current law, Runnels may not
have satisfied the cause requirement. 2 3 Emphasizing principles of com-
ity and finality of state court criminal judgments,2 4 and noting that cause
based wholly upon circumstantial and speculative factors would not be
accepted by the Supreme Court,2 5 the district court determined that
Runnels's showing would not satisfy the "cause" element. The court
found that Runnels did not show adequate cause even though his inabil-
ity to present testimony on the cause issue was solely due to the inter-
vening death of his trial counsel.
26
The Tenth Circuit approved the district court's heavy emphasis on
the "clear distinction drawn in Frady between standards of proof appli-
cable upon direct appeal and upon subsequent collateral attack."' 27 To
obtain collateral relief, a prisoner must clear a significantly higher hur-
dle than would exist on direct appeal. This is due to society's legitimate
interest in the finality of state criminal judgments and in encouraging
parties to seek a fair trial in the original criminal actions.
28
The Tenth Circuit similarly rejected Runnels's showing of preju-
dice. Citing Isaac and Frady, the court determined that the actual preju-
dice standard in a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus challenge
requires a greater showing of prejudice than is necessary to show plain
error on direct appeal. 29 Federal courts, in consideration of comity and
finality of state decisions, set a higher standard for habeas review of state
convictions than for direct review of federal convictions. 30 The circuit
court thus set a standard of prejudice that required Runnels to demon-
20. Id.
21. Id. at 600.
22. See id. at 597-98.
23. Id. at 598.
24. Id. at 598. The idea of comity and finality of criminal judgments is a recurrent
theme running through many habeas cases. See, e.g., Sykes, 433 U.S. at 74 (1977); Engle,
456 U.S. at 135.
25. 713 F.2d at 598 (citing Isaac and Frady).
26. 713 F.2d at 598.
27. See id. at 598-99.
28. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 162-66.
29. See id. at 599. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). The "plain error" rule gives the
courts of appeals the power to correct particularly excessive errors on appeal notwith-
standing a defendant's trial default. The rule provides: "Plain errors or default affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). By its terms, aid may be given under the rule only on
appeal from a trial that was attended by error so "plain" that the trial judge and prosecu-
tor were negligent in approving it, even absent the defendant's timely objection. The rule
was intended for use on direct appeal. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 163.
30. 713 F.2d at 599 (quoting Isaac, 456 U.S. at 134-35). See also Frady, 456 U.S. at 166
(1982); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). The Court in Isaac also noted that
the "plain error" standard is too vague to correct the miscarriages ofjustice that might be
at stake in federal habeas petitions. 456 U.S. at 134-35.
244 [Vol. 62:1
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strate that the prosecutor's remarks at trial worked to his "actual and
substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitu-
tional dimensions."'' 3 The court concluded that Runnels failed to meet
the cause and prejudice criteria as explained in Isaac and Frady.3 2 Be-
cause Runnels was unable to show cause for his counsel's noncompli-
ance with the contemporaneous objection rule, and because he was
unable to show he was actually prejudiced by the prosecutor's remarks,
the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of Runnels's writ of
habeas corpus and quashed the writ.
s"
Judge Logan, dissenting, found that the majority applied the actual
prejudice criterion of Sykes too strictly. He emphasized the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals' finding that actual prejudice had been
demonstrated since the prosecutor's statements amounted to reversible
error.3 4 According to Judge Logan, short of showing actual innocence,
a state court's determination that a defendant suffered actual prejudice
is "the most conclusive demonstration of prejudice possible."3 5 Judge
Logan argued that had defense counsel timely objected, a new trial
would have been ordered for the petitioner; "instead he is serving a
long prison term."
3 6
Judge Logan then admonished the majority's rigid application of
the cause criterion. His argument was based on the reasonable premise
that in some cases it will be "impossible to conclusively prove there was
or was not cause." 3 7 Asserting that the defense counsel was 74 years
old, of poor health, hard of hearing, and died before the habeas pro-
ceeding, 3 8 Judge Logan maintained that the cause test was unreasonable
here. Defense counsel's poor health and hearing problems constituted
circumstantial evidence that he never heard the prosecution's prejudicial
comments.39 Because counsel's intervening death prevented the court
from discovering why counsel failed to object, and because Runnels had
suffered actual prejudice, Judge Logan argued that the cause and preju-
dice requirements had been met.
40
Judge Logan concluded his dissent by recalling the majority state-
ment in Isaac: "The terms 'cause' and 'actual prejudice' are not rigid
concepts . . . . In appropriate cases, those principles must yield to the
imperative of a fundamentally unjust incarceration . . . . [W]e are con-
fident that victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the
cause-and-prejudice standard."' 4 1 According to Judge Logan, Isaac
31. 713 F.2d at 599 (citing Frady, 456 U.S. at 170).
32. 713 F.2d at 600.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 600-01 (Logan, J., dissenting).






41. Id. at 601 (quoting Isaac, 456 U.S. at 135). See also Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91; id. at 94-97
(Stevens, J., concurring).
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stands for the proposition that if a petitioner shows a "fundamental mis-
carriage ofjustice," relief should follow, notwithstanding petitioner's in-
ability to conclusively show cause for any failure by his attorney.
4 2
Thus, Judge Logan reproved the majority's strict application of the Sykes
cause and prejudice standard. Accordingly, he would have upheld the
writ of habeas corpus.
C. Hux v. Murphy
The question presented to the Tenth Circuit in Hux v. Murphy4 3 was
whether a habeas petitioner must satisfy the "cause and prejudice" test
when he has failed to comply with the state contemporaneous objection
rule, but where the state courts have nevertheless proceeded to consider
the claim on its merits on direct appeal. 4 4 In Hux, the petitioner sought
habeas relief alleging that the Oklahoma trial court issued an erroneous
jury instruction. 4 5 The instruction stated that there is a "legal presump-
tion that one intends the obvious and natural consequences of his acts,
unless the contrary is shown."' 46 Hux did not object to the constitution-
ality of the instruction at the trial but did challenge it on direct appeal.
4 7
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Hux's convic-
tion by applying the "fundamental error" exception to the contempora-
neous objection rule. 48 The court stated that as the instruction did not
raise itself to the level of fundamental error, Hux could not obtain a
reversal on direct appeal.4 9 Later, in response to Hux's petition for fed-
eral habeas corpus, the district court repeated the two-prong test in
Sykes, stating that since Hux had not objected to the instruction at trial,
he could now challenge it only by satisfying the cause and prejudice
standard.50 The district court then dismissed the petitioner's claim for
his failure to adequately demonstrate cause and actual prejudice. 5 1
In overturning the district court's decision to dismiss the petition,
the Tenth Circuit limited the cause and prejudice standard according to
Ulster County Court v. Allen. 5 2 The circuit court held that the lower court
had improperly applied the Sykes cause and prejudice test when it should
42. 713 F.2d at 601.
43. 733 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1984). Ruel Hux was convicted by ajury in an Oklahoma
state court of second degree burglary, and sentenced to twenty-eight years imprisonment.
44. Id. at 738-39.
45. Id. at 738.
46. Id. See also Record on Appeal to Okla. Crim. App., vol. 1, at 10. After deciding to
hear the petition on its merits, the Tenth Circuit discussed at length the issue of whether
this instruction amounted to a violation of Hux's right to due process. This right was in
jeopardy of being violated since the state can obtain a conviction only upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of all elements of a crime. 733 F.2d at 739.





52. 442 U.S. 140 (1979) (holding that absent a showing by the state legislature or
state courts that a federal constitutional claim is barred by some state procedural rule, a
federal court may entertain the claim).
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have adopted the law declared in the more recent Ulster decision. In
Ulster the Court found that a habeas petitioner need not satisfy the cause
and prejudice standard for failing to comply with a state procedural rule
if the state courts consider the claim on its merits on direct appeal.
53
The Tenth Circuit emphasized that under Ulster the cause and prejudice
standard is only applicable when "state courts invoke state law to dis-
miss a defendant's federal claims on procedural grounds." '54 In HUX, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed Hux's claim on the mer-
its under its "fundamental error" rule, notwithstanding his procedural
default at trial. 55 Therefore, the Sykes standard was inappropriately ap-
plied by the district court, and the Tenth Circuit was able to hear the
petitioner's claim on the merits. The Tenth Circuit thus confined the
expansion of the Sykes cause and prejudice standard. The cause and
prejudice test now must yield when a petitioner fails to timely object at
trial but the state appellate court nevertheless proceeds to consider the
petitioner's claim on its merits on direct appeal.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Barrett agreed with the majority's
decision to hear the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, but disagreed
with its failure to apply the cause and prejudice standard. 56 Relying on
the strict interpretations of the cause and prejudice standard in Runnels
v. Hess,5 7 Judge Barrett asserted that all federal habeas corpus chal-
lenges require a showing of cause and prejudice when petitioners do not
lodge contemporaneous objections.5" Judge Barrett noted that "the
'cause' and 'prejudice' standard is a difficult one to hurdle in terms of
proof," and concluded that Hess could not meet the standard.
5 9
D. Almond v. Angelone
Hux illustrated the Tenth Circuit's willingness to maintain the Sykes
standard within its reasonable limitations. Similarly, in Almond v.
Angelone,60 the circuit court limited the expansion of the Sykes cause and
prejudice standard by articulating a distinction between the failure to
comply with the contemporaneous objection rule as in Sykes, and the
failure to raise an issue on direct appeal that is later raised in the federal
habeas petition.
In Almond, issues not raised in the petitioner's first state post-convic-
tion petition were raised in his federal habeas petition.6 1 Thus, the
question before the Tenth Circuit was whether the petitioner's failure to
present these claims in his first post-conviction petition prevented the
53. Id. at 141.
54. 733 F.2d at 739 (citing Ulster, 442 U.S. at 147-54).
55. 733 F.2d at 739.
56. 733 F.2d at 740 (Barrett, J., concurring).
57. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text (explaining cause and prejudice test).
58. 733 F.2d at 740 (Barrett, J., concurring) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107
(1982); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982)).
59. 733 F.2d at 740 (Barrett, J., concurring).
60. No. 83-1550, (10th Cir. Oct. 18, 1983).
61. Id. at 3.
1984]
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circuit court from reaching the merits of the claims. The district court
found that the petitioner's claims were precluded from habeas consider-
ation since he failed to successfully demonstrate cause and prejudice as
required by Sykes.
62
The Tenth Circuit, in finding that the claims could be reached and
were in fact properly before the court, stated that "to apply Sykes to the
facts here, where the procedural default consists of a failure to raise an
issue in the first state post-conviction proceeding, would be an extension
of Sykes which we chose not to undertake here." 63 The Tenth Circuit
turned instead to the 1972 Supreme Court decision of Murch v. Mot-
tram64 which, relying on Fay v. Noia,6 5 applied the deliberate bypass
standard.
66
The Tenth Circuit first considered the deliberate bypass standard in
Holcomb v. Murphy.6 7 Under Holcomb, when a federal habeas petitioner
fails to raise an issue in his direct criminal appeal, the deliberate bypass
test of Fay v. Noia applies, not the cause and prejudice test of Sykes. 68 In
its decision, the court in Holcomb stated that "Fay v. Noia is still the law
and enunciates a broad enough rule to permit federal habeas considera-
tion of issues not raised in the direct state appeal."'6 9 This illustrates the
Tenth Circuit's willingness to apply the deliberate bypass test absent a
Supreme Court decision specifically requiring the cause and prejudice
standard. The Tenth Circuit's use of the deliberate bypass standard also
illustrates its inclination to hear a prisoner's claim unless the law clearly
shows that the petitioner has waived his rights.
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit in Almond, after finding no showing
of a deliberate bypass 70 on the petitioner's part, heard the claims on
their merits. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the district court's finding
that the petitioner's claims were without merit.
7'
II. EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court decided Rose v. Lundy,
72
62. Id. at 4. The petitioner was claiming ineffective assistance of counsel as counsel
did not investigate the post-arrest confession and counsel never got a psychiatrist's report.
See id. at 3-4.
63. Id. at 5.
64. 409 U.S. 41 (1972). Murch v. Mottram was a pre-Sykes case in which an issue not
raised by the petitioner in his first state post-conviction proceeding was raised in his fed-
eral habeas petition. The Court held that the petitioner deliberately chose to bypass or-
derly state procedures. The Court in Sykes did not discuss Murch.
65. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
67. 701 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3546 (1983).
68. Almond, slip op. at 5.
69. Id. (quoting Holcomb, 701 F.2d at 1312). See also Guzzardo v. Bengston, 643 F.2d
1300 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981).
70. Almond, slip op. at 6.
71. Id. at 7.
72. 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (where respondent Noah Lundy, following a jury trial, was
convicted on charges of rape and crimes against nature. He was sentenced to the state
penitentiary to serve consecutive terms of 120 years on the rape charge and from 5-15
years on the crimes against nature charge).
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adopting a "total exhaustion" policy. Under this policy, a habeas corpus
petitioner must exhaust all of his claims at the state level before he may
petition a federal district court for habeas relief.73 The Court in Lundy
held that a district court cannot consider habeas petitions which contain
both unexhausted and exhausted claims.
74
In response to Lundy, the Tenth Circuit heard Smith v. Atkins, 7 5 ad-
dressing a federal habeas petition containing both exhausted and
unexhausted claims. The district court considered two of the issues and
found them to be frivolous, then dismissed the remaining issues on the
ground that the petitioner had failed to exhaust his state remedies as
required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 76 In reversing and remanding the
case to the district court the Tenth Circuit discussed a nuance of the
"total exhaustion" requirement. 77 The Tenth Circuit first noted that
"[a]s a preliminary matter. . . the district court must 'review the record
in a § 2254 proceeding at least summarily in order to determine whether
all claims have been exhausted.' "78
The Smith court then attempted to clarify some of the existing con-
fusion as to exactly what is precluded by the exhaustion doctrine. Citing
Brown v. Allen, 79 the court explained that the exhaustion doctrine does
not automatically preclude federal habeas relief any time there remains a
state remedy.80 The court stated that "[w]hen a petitioner presents the
exact constitutional issue to the state courts on direct appeal, sufficient
exhaustion for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) will be presumed."
8 1
Then, under the exhaustion doctrine, a petitioner may resort to the fed-
eral courts to determine whether the state courts gave the issue "full and
fair consideration."
'8 2
The Smith v. Atkins decision was handed down after the district court
73. Id. at 510.
74. Id. at 522.
75. 678 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1982) (Smith challenged his state conviction of three
counts of kidnapping, one count of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of robbery).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2554(c) (1982) states: "An applicant shall not be deemed to have
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this
section, if he has the right under the law of the state to raise, by any available procedure,
the question presented."
77. See 678 F.2d at 884.
78. Id. (quoting Lundy, 455 U.S. at 527 (Blackman, J., concurring)).
79. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (holding that when a state prisoner's claim has been decided
adversely to him by the state supreme court on direct review of his conviction, he has
complied with 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which requires him to exhaust state remedies before a
federal court may entertain his application for habeas corpus). See id. at 446-50. The
Court added two points to this finding. First, under such circumstances, the prisoner need
not pursue a collateral remedy in the state courts based on the same evidence and issues.
Id. at 447-50. Second, § 2254 should not be interpreted as requiring prisoners to make
repetitious applications to state courts for relief. Id. at 448 n.3.
80. See 678 F.2d at 884-85 (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 524 n.l).
81. 678 F.2d at 885. The Tenth Circuit directed the district courts to Sandoval v.
Rodriguez, 461 F.2d 1097 (10th Cir. 1972), and the "legal versus factual" dichotomy con-
tained therein for guidance when determining whether the "exact" legal issue has been
presented. Smith v. Atkins, 678 F.2d at 885.
82. 678 F.2d at 885.
1984]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
decided Wilson v. Rayl.8 3 Due to the continued confusion in the trial
court, the Tenth Circuit heard Wilson v. Rayl on December 10, 1983.84
In Wilson v. Rayl a Kansas court convicted the petitioner, Wilson, of
robbery, burglary, and felony theft. 8 5 The Kansas Court of Appeals af-
firmed, 86 and the Kansas Supreme Court denied a petition for review.
87
In Wilson's petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, he set forth the
same grounds for relief as were presented to the Kansas appellate
courts. 8 8 Before filing this action in federal court, however, Wilson did
not avail himself of his state post-conviction remedies. 8 9 The district
court dismissed the action because Wilson failed to exhaust state reme-
dies before filing for relief in federal court.90 The Tenth Circuit, citing
its holding in Smith v. Atkins, reversed and remanded the case, holding
that the district court erred in dismissing Wilson's petition for failure to
exhaust state remedies. 9 1 Wilson's direct appeals were denied by the
state supreme court, so the Tenth Circuit found that Wilson's petition
for habeas corpus was properly before the federal district court,
notwithstanding his failure to exhaust state post-conviction remedies.
Both Smith v. Atkins and Wilson v. Rayl illustrate the Tenth Circuit's will-
ingness to hear state prisoners' habeas corpus petitions even though all
state remedies are not in fact totally exhausted.
Wilson v. Rayl is notable for the concurring opinion of Judge Bar-
rett.9 2 In his concurrence, Judge Barrett addressed the argument ad-
vanced by the prison warden, that the rule in Smith v. Atkins is too
"cumbersome."-93 Counsel for the warden maintained that the Smith de-
cision should be overruled because petitioners, rather than trial judges,
should bear the burden of proving exhaustion of state remedies.
94
Judge Barrett, however, reduced the confusion over who has the
burden of showing exhaustion. Stating that the initial burden of persua-
sion remains on the petitioner, the judge explained:
If it appears from the papers and records before the federal
83. No. 82-1242 (10th Cir. Dec. 10, 1983).
84. On the issue of exhaustion of state remedies, the Tenth Circuit also heard Marti-
nez v. Romero, No. 82-1726 (10th Cir. June 29, 1983). The record did not clearly show
that petitioner had exhausted his state remedies, so the Tenth Circuit remanded the case
to the district court for the purpose of determining whether petitioner had exhausted his
state remedies. The Tenth Circuit ruled that state prosecutors cannot waive the exhaus-
tion requirement. Id. at 4 (citing Naranjo v. Ricketts, 696 F.2d 83, 87 (10th Cir. 1982)).






91. Id. at 3.
92. Id. at 4 (Barrett, J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 3. The circuit court dismissed this claim by asserting that a circuit court
should not overrule a prior decision of the same court made up of different judges. The
court added that "[t]o do so puts the law [of the Circuiti into a state of flux, and no one
can tell what the law will be until the composition of the court is determined." Id. at 3




district court that the identical factual or legal issue was
presented and decided by the highest state court, then the issue
has in fact been exhausted. Where, however, it is not apparent
to the federal district court from the papers and records filed
by the petitioner that available state remedies have been fully
exhausted, the burden of proof on the exhaustion issue does
not shift either to the state or to the federal district court to
show such exhaustion.
95
Hence, Judge Barrett's concurring opinion in Wilson v. Rayl provides au-
thority for the proposition that the burden of proof remains on the peti-
tioner to show that the exact issue has been decided by the highest state
court and is therefore exhausted.
III. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Although the Tenth Circuit dealt with the issue of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel in many of the petitions for habeas corpus relief during
the period covered by this survey, 96 only one case actually discussed the
matter at length. That case, Maldonado v. Winans,9 7 did not present the
Tenth Circuit with an unfamiliar fact pattern.
In Maldonado,98 petitioner, under the direction of his counsel pled
guilty to a charge of escape from the New Mexico State Penitentiary. 99
Maldonado, the petitioner, offered the guilty plea in exchange for the
prosecution's promise not to use a prior conviction to upgrade the sen-
tence.10 0 Maldonado, however, believed the prior conviction was inva-
lid and informed his counsel of this, but his counsel still advised him to
plead guilty. 1 1 Later, Maldonado, with different counsel, proved the
prior conviction to be invalid. ' 0 2 Thus, petitioner argued that his guilty
plea was uninformed and involuntary due to his counsel's poor
advice. '
0 3
For reasons unknown, defense counsel waived any claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, and the district court focused its decision
95. No. 82-1242, slip op. at 2-3 (Barrett, J. concurring).
96. See Almond v. Angelone, No. 83-1550 (10th Cir. Oct. 18, 1983) (petitioner alleged
he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his trial and appeal; the Tenth Circuit
found petitioner's counsel met the constitutional standard pronounced in Dyer v. Crisp,
613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980)); Franklin v. Manfin, No. 82-2287
(10th Cir. Aug. 31, 1983) (holding that a petitioner has a right to counsel at reopening of
parole revocation hearings); Maldonado v. Winans, 728 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1984) (see infra
notes 107-119 and accompanying text); Martinez v. Romero. No. 82-1726 (10th Cir. June
29, 1983) (petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel but the Tenth Circuit Court
vacated and remanded the case to the district court to determine the issue of exhaustion,
and the circuit court never addressed the question of effective assistance of counsel); Run-
nels v. Hess, 713 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1983) (prisoner's counsel was hard of hearing, sick
during the prisoner's trial, and failed to make a timely objection that, if made, would have
allowed a finding of reversible error); see also supra notes 14-42 and accompanying text.
97. 728 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1983).
98. Id.
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solely on the voluntariness of petitioner's guilty plea.' 0 4 The Tenth Cir-
cuit, however, rejected the lower court's holding, and declared that "ef-
fective assistance of counsel . . .is indispensable to a voluntary guilty
plea."' 10 5 The circuit court added that "the standard of legal represen-
tation required by the sixth amendment ' 0 6 is indistinguishable from that
required by the fifth amendment10 7 for purposes of guaranteeing a vol-
untary guilty plea in this case." 1 08 Thus, the Tenth Circuit vacated and
remanded the district court decision for further consideration of the re-





106. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
U.S. CONST. amend. 6.
107. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person .. .shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. 5. Under
the fifth amendment, all guilty pleas must be voluntary. See, e.g., Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970).
108. 728 F.2d at 439 (citing Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1975)).
109. Id. (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 62:1
